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A Journey of Two Countries: A
Comparative Study of the Death Penalty
in Israel and South Africa
BY MICHELLE M. SHARONI*
Introduction
The ethical, moral and philosophical dilemmas associated with
the death penalty have been exhaustively researched and explored.
Nonetheless, the death penalty remains a complex and controversial
topic in many countries all around the world. Two countries, Israel
and South Africa, have traveled along diverse and fascinating paths in
deciding whether the death penalty is constitutional. This is their
story.
This note was partially inspired by the following statement: "No
one gives us rights. We win them in struggle. They exist in our hearts
before they exist on paper. Yet[,] intellectual struggle is one of the
most important areas of the battle for rights. It is through concepts
that we link our dreams to the acts of daily life."'
The decision to abolish the death penalty has been a struggle for
human rights, primarily, the right for life. This note examines the
intellectual struggle in maintaining that right by investigating the
history of the death penalty in Israel and South Africa, emphasizing
the process of its abolition. Part I of this note reviews the sources of
Hebrew law, the history of the death penalty in Israel and the Jewish
legal system. Part II addresses the history of the death penalty in
* J.D. candidate, Hastings College of the Law, 2001. This note is dedicated to
my parents, Dr. Asher and Tova Sharori, who have always taught by both word and
deed; and whose love and support encouraged my intellectual curiosity.
1. Celina Romany, Black Women and Gender Equality in a New South Africa:
Human Rights Law and the Intersection of Race and Gender, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
857 n.16 (1996) (quoting ALBIE SACHS, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NEW
SOUTH AFRICA vii (1990)).
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South Africa, from the period of the early settlers up to the recent
unanimous decision made in S. v. Makwanyane and Another (1995) to
abolish the death penalty. Part III examines international trends to
abolish the death penalty. Part IV proposes the steps necessary to
ending the death penalty in countries that still assert it.
I. Israel's Perspective on the Death Penalty
A. Origins of Hebrew Law
Hebrew law is rooted in the Torah and the Talmud. The Torah
consists of the five books that Moses received at Mount Sinai which
include:2 Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy.
The Torah consists of legal principles as they relate to all aspects of
life. All other sources of Jewish law are derived from the essence of
the Torah According to the Jewish perspective, the Torah is
considered the most authoritative and sacred source of Jewish law.4
The Talmud consists of the Mishnah and the Gemara.! The
Mishnah describes the unwritten tradition of many decades, including
different aspects of Jewish life.6 The Gemara explains the Mishnah.7
B. Eye for an Eye
According to the Torah, the death penalty was imposed for
various offenses, including intentional murder, crimes against the
family, and religious crimes.'
Hyman E. Goldin described the offenses for the death penalty as
falling under one of six categories: (1) eighteen moral abuses, arising
out of illicit sexual relations; (2) twelve violations of religious laws,
including witchcraft, desecration of the Sabbath and idolatry; (3)
three crimes against one's parents; (4) murder; (5) kidnapping and
2. Mechachem Elon, Authority, Rabbinical, in THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW,
54 (1975). The "Torah" here refers only to the written Torah, and not the oral
Torah. The oral Torah also received by Moses at Mount Sinai consisted of all of the
Jewish legal principles not explicit in the written law.
3. DAVID M. FELDMAN, THE STRUCTURE OF JEWISH LAW 23 (1968).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. ISAAC HERZOG, THE MAIN INSTITUTIONS OF JEWISH LAW 32 (1980).
7. Id. at 32-33.
8. Edna Erez, Thou Shalt Not Execute, Hebrew Law Perspective on Capital
Punishment, 19 CRIMINOLOGY 25 (1981).
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selling into slavery; and (6) rebelliousness.9
The Torah illustrates the general notion regarding the aptness of
the death penalty in one of its most infamous statements: when men
fight and damage results, "the penalty shall be life for life, eye for an
eye, tooth for tooth ... ."'0 Under the Torah's law, murder is a crime
against society and thus society is required to atone for the crime.1
C. The Sanctity of Human Life in Hebrew Law
The sanctity of life is so essential in Jewish law that it necessitates
violating the Sabbath, Yom Kippur and Tishah Be'av (the holiest
days in the Jewish religion) even if only to treat the life of one who is
sick or injured and is surely to die soon thereafter. Based on this
view, all human life is treated equally. There is no difference between
the killer of a one-day-old baby or that of a one hundred-year old
man. In each of these theoretical scenarios, the person responsible
for the act is a killer and should be punished by being put to death.
The value of life has no measure or gradation, the life of the very old
or the very young are equally worthy.
One may argue that there is a paradox in existence here.
According to the Jewish perspective, life is sacred. Thus, one would
imagine that this view would prevent the implementation of the death
penalty. Yet, it is the sanctity of life, which ultimately demands that
the killer be punished by death for taking the life of another human
being.
The sanctity of all life is the predominant principle in discussions
about capital punishment." It is this principle that ultimately
rendered the imposition of the death penalty rare or even nonexistent
in Jewish law.1
3
D. Biblical Methods of Executing Criminals
In Biblical times, punishment was to be carried out swiftly. The
9. Compare HYMAN E. GOLDIN, HEBREW CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 26-
28 (1952), with GEORGE HOROWITZ, THE SPIRIT OF JEWISH LAW 159-60 (1973) who
divides the offenses into four categories: offenses against God and religious
observances, offenses against the social order, violence against person, and
immorality and indecency.
10. Exodus 21:23-24; see also Leviticus 24:17 ("If a man kills any human being, he
shall be put to death.").
11. GOLDIN, supra note 9, at 21.
12. See generally Erez, supra note 8.
13. Id.
2001]
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person avenging the death of the victim took the life of the offender.'4
The Torah proscribes four methods for the death penalty: stoning,
burning, slaying, and hanging. 5
Stoning was considered the most severe form of execution. 6 The
entire community was expected to participate in the stoning
execution. 7 Currently, there is no evidence to suggest whether and
how the Jews carried out executions by burning. 8 Hanging was only
used as a method for executing non-Jews who had followed their own
laws. 9 One of the primary objections expressed against the death
penalty, particularly hanging, was respect for the image of God.'"
Throughout Jewish history, selecting an appropriate form of death
has been very significant in the minds of many Jewish academics. The
rationale behind this selection is, and has always been, the
preservation of human dignity coupled with maintaining the spirit of
the law.
21
E. Reluctance in the Imposition of the Death Penalty
Death penalty advocates wishing to find moral and historical
justification for implementing capital punishment have misinterpreted
Jewish law. While the Torah does refer to imposing the death
penalty, Talmudic interpretation reveals that Rabbis developed
various hurdles designed to make death sentences virtually
impossible.'
There have been numerous efforts by Talmudic Rabbis to
express their reluctance to impose the ultimate punishment, namely,
the death penalty. Rabbi Meir's expressions of anguish best illustrate
this resistance: "When a man suffers punishment, what does the
Shekinah Divine Presence say? As it were, I am lighter than [m]y
head, I am lighter than [m]y arm."' This passage expresses the notion
14. DAVID DE SOLA POOL, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AMONG THE JEWS 15 (1916).
15. Erez, supra note 8, at 29.
16. HOROWITZ, supra note 9, at 171.
17. See, e.g., Leviticus 26:16 ("The whole community shall stone him."); Numbers
15:35 ("The whole community shall pelt him with stones.").
18. Haim H. Cohn, Capital Punishment, in THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW 526
(Menachem Elon ed., 1975).
19. See, e.g., Genesis 40:22.
20. Erez, supra note 8, at 30.
21. Id. at 33.
22. GERALD J. BLIDSTEIN, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT THE CLASSIC JEWISH
DISCUSSION 317 (1965).
23. Mishnah, Sanhedrin 6:5, quoted in GOLDIN, supra note 9, at 25.
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that God is tormented by human suffering and is tired (i.e.,
exemplified by a heavy head and arm) from its existence. This strong
reluctance to impose the death penalty combined with numerous
procedural and evidentiary barriers had the practical effect of
rendering the death penalty unenforceable. 4
F. Procedural and Evidentiary Barriers
The traditional resistance to imposing the death penalty has been
evidenced by the various procedural and evidentiary barriers
established by the Rabbis. The Rabbis surrounded the accused with
many safeguards, making the imposition of the death penalty virtually
impossible.' The goal of the judicial system was to invoke witness
testimony that would help the accused, rather than testimony that
would denounce the accused. 6 The rationale behind this process was
the Rabbinical fear of convicting and executing an innocent person.'
The tools used to eliminate the death penalty consisted of five major
categories: (i) jurisdictional requirements; (ii) procedural
requirements; (iii) testimonial requirements; (iv) qualifications
pertaining to judges; and (v) sentencing and appellate procedure.
1. Jurisdictional Requirements
The jurisdictional requirements served as the greatest obstacle to
the imposition of the death penalty." Only a high tribunal of twenty-
three judges had the jurisdiction to try capital cases (this tribunal was
referred to as Beit-Din).29 If the Beit-Din opened its adjudication
process with a unanimous vote against the defendant, then he was
acquitted.' This is because such an opening could only mean that the
court had failed to sufficiently engage in the defense of the defendant,
since it would be virtually impossible not to find some argument in
favor of the defendant.' The accused could only be convicted if some
of the Beit-Din members voted to acquit because that would imply
24. See GOLDIN, supra note 9, at 26.
25. See DE SOLA POOL, supra note 14, at 14-15; see also GOLDIN, supra note 9, at
24.
26. GOLDIN, supra note 9, at 28.
27. Bruce S. Ledewitz & Scott Staples, Reflections on the Talmudic and American
Death Penalty, 6 FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 33,35 (1993).
28. See AARON M. SCHREIBER, JEWISH LAW AND DECISION-MAKING 220 (1979).
29. Erez, supra note 8, at 33.
30. Id. at 34.
31. Id.
2001]
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that the court had considered arguments in favor of the defendant."
Also, the Rabbis denied jurisdiction to any court when the alleged
crime was one for which the Torah prescribes banishment as the
punishment."
2. Procedural Requirements
The procedural requirements rendered conviction in capital
cases practically impossible. Adjudication of capital cases had to start
and end in the daytime.'
Two capital cases could not be heard on the same day because
briefness of time would prevent the court from engaging itself in the
defense of each defendant.' Furthermore, the trial could not be held
on the eve of the Sabbath.36
Regardless of the number of witnesses, each eyewitness had to
be examined very carefully.37 The witnesses were required to be
rational adults without any personal relationship to the defendant and
could not have any interest in the case.' The judges began
deliberations only if, after the testimony of each eyewitness, the
evidence appeared to be unfavorable to the defendant.39
The trial was not adversarial in nature; rather, the judges were
required to act in defense of the accused. ° The Torah required two
witnesses in a capital case. Numbers 35:30 states, "Who so killeth any
person, the murdered shall be put to death by the mouth of witnesses:
but one witness shall not testify against any person to cause him to
die."41
This was a very strict requirement. This passage was read
broadly and employed to eliminate the use of circumstantial evidence
to convict an accused. The Talmud states, "I saw a man chasing
another into a ruin; I ran after him and saw a sword in his hand
32. The Code of Maimonedes, 14 Judges 28, Ch. 9, §§ 1, 2.
33. See, e.g., Numbers 19:16-20 (person who touches corpse and does not cleanse
himself "shall be cut off from Israel").
34. Erez, supra note 8, at 34.
35. Id.
36. SCHREIBER, supra note 28, at 268 (quoting Maimonides, Mishnah Torah 11:2).
37. HOROWITZ, supra note 9, at 644.
38. Erez, supra note 8, at 34.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Numbers 35:30 ("[T]he testimony of a single witness against a person
shall not suffice for a sentence of death.").
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dripping with the other's blood and the murdered man in his death
agony. I said to him, You villain! Who killed this man? Either I or
you. But what can I do? Your life is not delivered into my hand, for
the law says, at the mouth of two witnesses shall he that is to die be
put to death."'42
3. Testimonial Requirements
The Torah was also interpreted to exclude the testimony of the
murderer himself.43 Thus, a murderer's own confession, no matter the
probity, was inadmissible in a capital crime case. This was a strictly
guarded rule and all statements that could arguably imply guilt were
construed to avoid such interpretation. ' Jewish law also required
witnesses' testimony to be uncontroverted as to any fact. If there was
discrepancy between their testimony, it was excluded. In effect, this
rule was employed to exclude the testimony of witnesses who would
testify to the defendant's guilt.45
Moreover, these witnesses endured separate and intense
interrogations prior to being questioned about various details of the
crime. Rabbi Yochanan Ben Zakkai illustrated this technique when
he interrogated witnesses about the number of figs growing on the
tree beneath which the crime was committed.46 Some have argued
that the sole aim of this type of questioning was to evade the death
penalty.
The Torah also required the defendant to be forewarned of the
possible consequences of his actions.47 The defendant could only be
sentenced to die if two witnesses had advised the defendant of the
potential consequences of his crime.'M The accused also must have
acknowledged this penalty before the proceeding.49 This requirement
was applicable only to cases where the death penalty, not
imprisonment, was at issue."
Furthermore, the court did not recognize the death penalty for
42. Israel J. Kazis, Judaism and the Death Penalty, in CONTEMPORARY JEWISH
ETHICS 327 (S. Daniel Breslauer ed., 1959).
43. See Erez, supra note 8, at 34.
44. See AARON KIRSCHENBAUM, SELF-INCRIMINATION IN JEWISH LAW 39 (1970).
45. See BLIDSTEIN, supra note 22, at 317.
46. The Code of Maimonedes, supra note 32, at 14 Judges 28, Ch. 9, §§ 1, 2.
47. Kazis, supra note 42, at 328.
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felony murder. Thus, an accessory was not subject to the death
penalty. 1 The individual sentenced to die had to be the one who
directly caused the death. 2
Finally, when none of the procedures above could stop the
implementation of the death penalty, there was a loophole in Jewish
law. The lower courts could implement the death penalty only if the
Great Sanhedrin53 met within the grounds of the Second Temple.'
4. Qualifications of Judges
Rabbis imposed numerous requirements on the qualification of
judges in death penalty cases. For example, men who served on the
court had to display compassion.5
Additionally, the men had to be accomplished with impeccable
character in the community. 6  Furthermore, the judges were
constrained in their personal activities during the trial. For example,
if a capital case was adjourned until the next day, the judges went
home in pairs, ate very little, did not drink wine, discussed the case all
night, and returned to court the following day. 7 These requirements
exemplify the Rabbi's distaste for the death penalty.
5. Sentencing and Appellate Procedures
As the guilty defendant was led to his death, a person announced
the upcoming execution. This provided an opportunity for anyone to
say a word in favor of the guilty party. 8
On the other hand, if the accused was acquitted at trial, a retrial
was improper notwithstanding any new evidence. 9 If the accused was
found guilty, he was immediately taken to be executed.' No appeal
was allowed following an acquittal although after a conviction, an
51. An accessory could, however, be tried under non-capital procedure and
imprisoned. Sanhedrin 24:26. However, if an accessory was tried under capital
strictures, he was adjudged innocent and released. Sanhedrin 18:8.
52. Mishnah Sanhedrin 6:5, quoted in GOLDIN, supra note 9, at 24.
53. The Great Sanhedrin was considered the highest court of the land.
54. The Second Temple was destroyed in 70 C.E.
55. Kazis, supra note 42, at 327.
56. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 14, at 32.
57. GOLDIN, supra note 9, at 128.
58. Id. at 270.
59. Kazis, supra note 42, at 329.
60. SCHREIBER, supra note 28, at 269.
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appeal could be made at any time.61 Finally, in certain instances (e.g.,
when legal technicalities tainted the trial), the court could commute a
death sentence to life imprisonment.62
The numerous barriers imposed by the judicial system on the
implementation of the death penalty depicts the rarity of execution.
Moreover, such barriers show the practical impossibility of sentencing
a criminal defendant to death. Although the Rabbis could not
supersede the words of the Torah by abolishing the death penalty
completely, their Talmudic interpretations had the same effect.
G. Theories Explaining the Rarity of Execution in Israel
In Jewish law, there is a correlation between moral value and the
law. As such, religion is the law. The moral force of religion is given
explicit effect in the law. There are two moral forces which could
possibly account for the court's structuring of the death penalty
system to thwart executions. First, as discussed above, the Biblical
requirement of mercy reduces the number of executions because of
the overriding belief in preserving the sanctity of life. The second
possible basis for this phenomenon is the value the Jewish religion
places upon the sanctity of human life. In Judaism, the person is
viewed as created in God's image. The fact that a person may have
been a sinner is of no consequence. The Torah makes no distinction
between involuntary killing and premeditated murder, reinforcing the
value of all human life. Thus, because the sanctity and value of life is
so fundamental under Jewish law, the death penalty is a rare event.
How often the death penalty was used is still a matter of speculation,
but some scholars have suggested that more than one execution every
seven years was unacceptable.'
From the analysis above, it is evident that executions in Israel
were rare. Mainly, this was due to the procedures that the Sanhedrin
and Jewish law required for the implementation of the death penalty.
Moreover, executions were infrequent in Israel because of the merger
of morality and religion in Jewish law. For in Judaism, religion and
moral values are, and always have been, the law.
61. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 14, at 34 (quoting Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:1).
62. See id. at 22-23.
63. Gerald J. Blidstein, Capital Punishment - The Classic Jewish Discussion, in
CONTEMPORARY JEWISH ETHics 310,317 (1979).
2001]
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H. South Africa's Perspective on the Death Penalty
A. The History of the Death Penalty in South Africa
In 1652, the Dutch East India Company built its first European
settlement in South Africa. At that time, South African courts
imposed the death penalty for a variety of offenses, including murder
(for which the death penalty was mandatory), rape, treason, arson,
theft, robbery, fraud, sodomy, bestiality, and incest.' Executions
usually took place in public by hanging or decapitation.65 On occasion,
these executions were conducted by slow strangulation, burying alive,
or impaling.6
In 1795, the British arrived in South Africa. The British
Commander, General Craig, pleaded to abolish the torturous
executions, suggesting that mere hanging or decapitation would be
satisfactory.67 However, this suggestion was dismissed. Nonetheless,
torture stopped in 1796 when the Royal Instructions to the Earl of
Macartney ended all forms of legal torture in the British colonies and
possessions.'
The abolition of the torturous executions in South Africa
resulted in a lower number of executions in general.69 The number of
capital crimes decreased between 1840 and 1910, and by 1910, the
death penalty was restricted to cases of murder.7' Although the death
64. George Devenish, The Historical and Jurisprudential Evolution and
Background to the Application of the Death Penalty in South Africa and its
Relationship with the Constitutional and Political Reform, 5 S. AFR. J. CRIM. JUST. 1,
5-6 (1992).
65. Ellison Kahn, Remarks at the Symposium on Capital Punishment (April 1-4,
1975), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON CRIME, LAW AND THE COMMUNITY
220,221 (1976).
66. Peter Norbert Bouckaert, Shutting Down the Death Factory: The Abolition of
Capital Punishment in South Africa, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 287, 288 (1996) (citing
Ellison Kahn, The Death Penalty in South Africa, 33 TYDSKRIFT VIR HEDENDAAGSE
ROMEINS-HOLLANDSE REG 108,109 (1970)).
67. See generally LOURENS M. DU PLESSIS & A.G. DU PLESSIS, AN INTRODUCTION
TO LAW 45, 46 (1992).
68. Bouckaert, supra note 66, at 288 (citing Ellison Kahn, The Death Penalty in
South Africa, 33 TYDSKRIFT VIR HEDENDAAGSE ROMEINS-HOLLANDSE REG 108, 109
(1970)).
69. SIR JOHN BARROW, AN ACCOUNT OF TRAVELS INTO THE INTERIOR OF
SOUTHERN AFRICA, IN THE YEARS 1797 AND 1798, at 44-45 (1801) (cited in Ellison
Kahn, The Death Penalty in South Africa, 33 TYDSKRIFT VIR HEDENDAAGSE
ROMEINS-HOLLANDSE REG 108, 109 (1970)).
70. See Kahn, supra note 65, at 221.
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penalty was mandatory for murder, the executive branch commuted a
large number of death sentences.
7'
B. The Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act of 1917
In 1917, the Union of South Africa passed its first countrywide
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act ("The Act"). 7 The Act
imposed a mandatory death sentence for murder, rape and treason.'
At first, this seemingly rigid rule had limited impact because juries
found defendants guilty of lesser offenses to avoid imposing the death
penalty 4  In 1935, the concept of extenuating circumstances was
introduced.75
In 1945, the Smuts government appointed an investigatory
commission under the leadership of Mr. Justice Landsdown to
examine the existence of the death penalty. The commission decided
against its abolition. The commission articulated the rationale for its
decision when it announced that "in the mind of the undeveloped
Native[J but recently brought into contact with western civilisation
and ideas, the sanctity of human life is a matter of less concern than it
would be to the western civilised man.' '76  The commission
distinguished the experiences of abolishment countries by citing the
"difference of racial and consequently of social and economic
conditions."
71. South Africa: The Death Penalty, AMNESTY INT'L NEWSL., Feb. 1989, at 7.
72. Kahn, supra note 65, at 221.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. David Welsh, Capital Punishment in South Africa, in AFRICAN PENAL
SYSTEMS 397, 398-99 (Alan Milner ed., 1969). In 1949, the following extenuating
circumstances were recognized:
(i) Immaturity of the mind, as might be found in a youth or mentally
undeveloped persons;
(ii) Degeneracy of the mind, as might be seen in extreme old age;
(iii)Undue influence of a person in authority, though not amounting in law
to coercion;
(iv)Reason or judgement clouded (e.g. by drink or drugs);
(v) Distraction of the mind not amounting in law to provocation (e.g. the
killing of an unfaithful wife by her husband);
(vi)A wrong, but not entirely unreasonable belief that a fatal attack was
about to occur;
(vii)Minor degree of participation in a crime;
(viii)Diminished heinousness (e.g. mercy killings).
76. PENAL AND PRISON REFORM COMMITrEE, REPORT OF THE PENAL AND
PRISON REFORM COMMITTEE 460 (1947).
77. Id.
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The next group commissioned to look into penal issues,
appointed in 1974, was explicitly prohibited from considering the
question of the death penalty.78
The implementation of the death penalty increased in 1948 with
the rise of the Afrikaner National Party. The number of capital
crimes increased, as the death penalty became a tool of state
repression. 9  During the apartheid era, executions for political
offenses were relatively common in South Africa. The first wave of
political executions took place in the mid-1960s when about sixty
members of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) were executed.'
Executions of this type continued until the fall of the apartheid
government.8'
Executions in South Africa were viewed specifically as tools for
controlling and punishing opponents of apartheid.' This is
particularly evident in the state's treatment of accused members of
banned liberation movements. For instance, in 1983, the execution of
three convicted African National Congress (ANC) combatants was
timed to coincide with the seventh anniversary of uprisings in the
black township of Soweto.'
C. Racism and the Death Penalty
Extensive evidence exists indicating that racial discrimination
played a significant role in the implementation of the death penalty in
apartheid South Africa. A 1988 Amnesty International study showed
that during a one-year period, forty-seven percent of blacks convicted
of murdering whites were sentenced to death, compared to no death
sentences for whites convicted of murdering blacks, and only two and
a half percent for blacks convicted of killing blacks.'
One commentator stipulated that between 1910 and 1975, blacks
were executed twenty-seven times more often than whites.8 A study
78. Janos Mihalik, The Moratorium on Executions: Its Background and
Implications, 108 S. AFR. L.J. 118, 122 (1991).
79. Bouckaert, supra note 66, at 291.
80. Nathan V. Holt, Jr., Human Rights and Capital Punishment. The Case of
South Africa, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 273,301 (1989).
81. Id. at 302.
82. Dana L. Bogie, Life or Death? The Death Penalty in the United States and the
New Republic of South Africa, 3 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 229,230 (1996).
83. Holt, supra note 80, at 303.
84. AMNESTY INT'L NEWSL., supra note 71, at 6.
85. JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER
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of rape sentencing between 1947 and 1969 found that no whites were
executed for the rape of black women, despite 288 such convictions.
During the same period, 120 out of 844 black men convicted of raping
white women were executed.86
Many whites in South Africa perceived themselves as an isolated
minority group under constant attack from the majority African
population.' After the Civil War, the institution of a rigid penal code
and the extensive use of the death penalty were seen as necessary
precautions to protect the white minority and to preserve white
supremacy." Many whites believed that the black population had a
greater propensity to violence; thus, use of the death penalty against
blacks was designed, at least in part, to ingrain and protect the
sanctity of white life."
An examination of the death penalty in South Africa leaves a
sobering impression. Although reliable statistics are difficult to
obtain, it appears that between 1981 and 1990 approximately 1,100
people were executed in South Africa.' The previous decade (1971-
1980) claimed the lives of another 841 people.91
Between 1978 and 1988, the number of executions fell below 100
per year only once. These numbers place South Africa near the top
of the world's executing countries.'
The number of executions per year continued to rise in the late
1980s, reaching a stunning 164 deaths in 1987, the equivalent of
almost one execution every two days.'
D. The Abolition of the Death Penalty in South Africa
The abolition of the death penalty in South Africa was an event
of historical proportions. With so many criminals being put to death,
the abolitionist movement in South Africa began to build strength
126-27 (1978).
86. Id. at 128.
87. Welsh, supra note 75, at 419.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. State v. Makwanyane & Mchunu, 1995 (3) SALR 391,508 (CC) (O'Regan, J.,
concurring), available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *329.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Heads of Argument on Behalf of the Appellants para. 49, Makwanyane, 1995
(3) SALR 391 (CC) (in South Africa, the briefs filed by the parties with the Court are
called "Heads of Argument").
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throughout the 1970s. The formation of the Society for the Abolition
of the Death Penalty in South Africa, headed by B. Van Niekerk,
dramatically lowered the number of people being executed. For
example, in 1970-73, a total of 246 persons were executed.94 However,
this group soon lost its effectiveness." In 1987, 164 people in one
South African city were executed, amounting to "thirty-two times
more than [the number of executions in] China[,] with its population
of [two] billion."96
The trend in the number of persons being executed changed
again in 1988. After a campaign to save a highly publicized group of
accused criminals known as the "Sharpville Six," international and
domestic pressure to abolish the death penalty in South Africa helped
lower the actual number of people put to death.7 In 1988, the death
toll was 117 people, and in 1989, the number executed decreased
significantly to fifty-three. Although fifty-three might appear low,
South Africa was still executing people in numbers that were
relatively large considering the size of the country's population.98
With the death penalty in force and large numbers of South
African blacks being sentenced to death, pressure was placed on the
government to establish some guidelines to curb the death penalty."
On February 2, 1990, President F.W. De Klerk announced a
moratorium on the death penalty." In his speech, the President
called for the reform of the death penalty by stating that it should be
revised to limit its applicability only to extreme cases. This endeavor
would be accomplished by broadening judicial discretion in its
imposition, and by establishing an automatic appeal process for those
sentenced to death.'0 '
In response to President De Klerk's speech, the Parliament
enacted the Criminal Law Amendment Act ("Amendment Act").
The Amendment Act limited the death penalty to six crimes,
94. B.V.D. Van Niekerk, Hanged By The Neck Until You Are Dead, 86 S. AFR.
L.J. 457,458 (1969).
95. Devenish, supra note 64, at 11.
96. Id. at 12.
97. Id. at 13. The "Sharpville Six" were six men sentenced to death for being
named as the killers of Sharpville Counselor Khuzwayne Dlamini.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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including murder." Because of the moratorium, the last execution in
South Africa was the hanging of S. Ngobeni on November 14, 1989."°
George Devenish, author of The Evolution, stated, "[t]he
abolition of the death penalty in South Africa would contribute to the
process of political reconciliation, since many blacks view the
excessive use of the death penalty in South Africa as a tool of
oppression by a minority racist regime."104 Many people began to
predict a change in South Africa regarding apartheid and the justice
system." After the moratorium was announced, Nelson Mandela, a
prominent black leader, was released from prison.06 This signaled the
birth of a new justice system in South Africa, confirming Devenish's
predictions to be true.
E. The Constitutional Court of South Africa
In 1993, South Africa adopted a transitional Constitution (also
referred to as the "IC") based on respect for fundamental rights and
equity between people of all races. 7
The Constitution was formed through negotiations conducted by
the Multi-Party Negotiation Process." Technical committees advised
negotiators through documented reports." In 1994, the
Constitutional Court established the 1996 permanent Constitution,
which complied with the constitutional provisions agreed in advance
by the negotiators of the interim Constitution."0
The Constitutional Assembly - that is, the old Parliament - must
implement the Constitution.' The Assembly, if it has any questions
regarding a proposed portion of the new Constitution, can submit the
portion to the Constitutional Court for its opinion."'
The Assembly differs from South Africa's old government, a
102. Devenish, supra note 64, at 27.
103. See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 402 n.1, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS
218, at *6 n.1.
104. Devenish, supra note 64, at 27.
105. See Bogie, supra note 82, at 233.
106. Id.
107. DION BASSON, SOUTH AFRIcA'S INTERIM CONSTITUTION V (1965).
108. Id. at 1-2.
109. Id.
110. See Information About the Constitutional Court, available at
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parliamentary system, because now a Court and a Constitution
govern along with the Assembly."'
Before the Constitution was ratified, the people of South Africa
were very proud of their new Constitution. Chapter Three of the
interim Constitution lays out the fundamental rights of South African
citizens and instructs how the courts are to interpret those rights. 4
Section eleven, subsection two prohibits "cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.""' 5 Additionally, Section eight
states that "every person shall have the right to equality before the
law and equal protection of the law."".6
Section nine proclaims that "every person should have the right
to life.""' 7 Similarly, Section ten states that "every person shall have
the right to respect for and protection of his or her dignity."".. These
provisions clearly mandate that the interpretation of constitutionally
protected rights must be enlightened and influenced by a
consideration of international law and may be influenced by judicial
consideration of foreign constitutional jurisprudence."9
F. The Constitutional Court in South Africa
Along with the new Constitution and the Parliament, a new
Constitutional Court was created. The new President of South
Africa, Nelson Mandela, who stated, "[t]he last time I was in court
was to hear whether or not I was going to be sentenced to death,"
inaugurated the new judges of the Court."n This new Court consists of
eleven members, nine men and two women, each serving a non-
renewable term of twelve years, with a mandatory retirement age of
seventy.' The installation of the new judges was "another milestone
on [South Africa's] difficult journey toward democracy and a culture
of human rights."'' South Africa now has a system of checks and
113. Id.
114. See BASSON, supra note 107, at 2.
115. S. AFR. CONST. § 11(2).
116. Id. § 8.
117. Id. § 9.
118. Id. § 10.
119. See Information About the Constitutional Court, supra note 110.
120. Paul Taylor, Mandela Swears in the First Constitutional Court; By Creating a
System of Checks and Balances, South Africa Joins World's Democracies, WASH.
POST, Feb. 15, 1995, at A13.
121. See Information About the Constitutional Court, supra note 110.
122. Id.
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balances similar to those of other democracies around the world.23
G. The Process by Which a Case Reaches the New Court
First, the case must go to the Supreme Court, which can refer the
case to the Constitutional Court or decide the case itself.' The role
of the Constitutional Court, as the judges were told during their
inauguration, is to act as guardian and protector of the Constitution.
The Constitutional Court is guided by wisdom and a deep respect for
human rights, and, in particular, the dignity of every woman and man
in their country. Second, an appeal can be lodged with the
Constitutional Court. If the judges on the Supreme Court think that
a case involves constitutional interpretation, they send the case to the
new Constitutional Court, putting their decision on hold.Y If the.
Constitutional Court decides that the question posed relates to an
interpretation of the Constitution, it will hear the case.
7
The Court is an important part of the new South Africa and its
new democratic government. It has the authority to overrule the
Parliament when laws are established that the Court interprets as
unconstitutional.'27 The Court can also review and evaluate disputes
within the Parliament. 9
H. The New Court's Proceedings
The Court is open to the public and to the press, although no
cameras or recorders are permitted.3 The Court decides whether the
issue(s) implicated in the case relate to the Constitution and if they
do, whether they fall within the Constitution's parameters.3
The Court does not hear evidence or question any witnesses, and
it does not decide whether someone is guilty or deserves damages."
The Court plays an important role in the evolution of a
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Bogie, supra note 82, at 242.
126. Taylor, supra note 120, at A13.
127. Id.
128. South Africa High Court Sworn, Morning Edition, Feb. 15, 1995, at
WESTLAW, AFRNEWS Database.
129. See Information About the Constitutional Court, supra note 110.
130. Id. The court is in session as follows: February 15 to March 31, May 1 to May




Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
democratic society in South Africa.133 The judges must view their
roles as protectors of the rights of South African citizens.'"M Mr.
Dullah Omar, Mvinister of Justice, reminded them, "[T]he eyes of the
people of South Africa-and indeed the world-are upon you. We
wish you success." '35  The eyes of South African inmates and
abolitionists around the world were definitely watching when the
Court decided its first case: the constitutionality of the death penalty.
L State v. Makwanyane & Mchunw The End of the Death Penalty
for South Africa
Themba Makwanyane and Mvuso Mchunu robbed a bank
security vehicle, which was delivering monthly wages to the
Coronation Hospital in Johannesburg.136 The robbers had been
armed with AK-47s and had opened fire on the security vehicle and
the accompanying vehicle. Consequently, two occupants in the
vehicle were killed, and a third was seriously wounded. The robbers
also killed two police officers in an accompanying vehicle. On April
14, 1992, the trial court found the two defendants guilty of four counts
of murder, one count of attempted murder, and one count of robbery
with aggravated circumstances. Two weeks later, they were
sentenced to death on each of the four counts of murder."8
As provided under the new legislation, the appellate division
automatically reviewed the death sentences. Although the sentences
had been imposed before the new interim Constitution came into
effect, counsel for the defense argued at the appellate division
hearing that the sentences were inconsistent with fundamental rights
contained in the Constitution. The court dismissed the appeals on the
attempted murder charge and the robbery charge.39 The appellate
division decided that for the murder charges, the accused should
receive the heaviest penalty available under the law. However, the
new Constitution was implemented during the review of this case,
thus the appellate division postponed its hearing on the murder
charges until the constitutional issues could be decided by the
133. See generally Information About the Constitutional Court, supra note 110.
134. Id.
135. Bogie, supra note 82, at 229, citing Inaugural address.
136. State v. Makwanyane & Mchunu, 1995 (3) SALR 391, 504, available at 1995
SACLR LEXIS 218, at *319.
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Constitutional Court.14
On February 15, 1995, the Constitutional Court began hearing
the case. The issues presented by the defendants were: (1) "the
constitutionality of Section 277(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act,"
and (2) "the implications of Section 241(8) of the Constitution.'
141
The Court decided that because the issue of constitutionality was not
raised at trial, since the Constitution was not yet in force, counsel for
each side would appear before the Court to argue their case.'42
The Court decided unanimously that the death penalty was
unconstitutional. 43  The President of the Court wrote the main
opinion, with each of the other judges writing a separate concurring
opinion. The concurrences stressed the historic importance of the
decision itself. Furthermore, the Court used many resources to reach
its conclusion. It used the sections of the Constitution mentioned
earlier to evaluate the constitutionality of the death penalty. 44 In
analyzing the sections of the Constitution, the Court looked at
parliamentary material to aid in the interpretation of ambiguous or
obscure terms.45
The Court, under the guidance of Section thirty-five, subsection
one of the Constitution, also considered foreign law in its attempt to
understand the international aspects of the death penalty.146 The laws
and the interpretation of those laws came from many international
sources. The Court first examined whether or not the death penalty
violated the right to equal protection under the law. The Court found
disparity in the application of the death penalty because the Criminal
Procedure Act, which allowed for the death penalty, was in force only
in the "Old Republic of South Africa."'47 The other "states' 41 of
South Africa had either repealed the death penalty altogether or
developed different criteria for its imposition.
140. Id. at 401, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *42.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See generally Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 405, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *52.
146. See generally Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391.
147. Id. at 411, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *66.
148. Id. The other "states" refers to the former Transkei, Bophuthatswana,
Venda or Ciskei, which were then treated as independent states under South African
law and had their own legislation. Although their respective Criminal Procedure
statutes were based on the South African legislation, there were differences,
including in regard to the death penalty. Id.
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Under Section 229 of the Constitution, all of the laws in force in
any area of the national territory, immediately before the
commencement of the Constitution, were to remain in force, subject
to repeal or amendment. 49 Therefore, the Criminal Procedure Act
applied only to the "Old Republic of South Africa," and not to the
other "States."'50 Now that one new national territory existed, the
rules needed to be the same.
The defendants argued that the disparity in sentencing violated
their rights to "equal protection under the law."'51 The Court agreed.
It stated that the Constitution was formed to bring the country
together, and, under Section 229 of the Constitution, it can rule that
Section 277 caused disparity in the sentencing structure of South
Africa.5 The Court mentioned that disparity is only one of the
factors it used to find that the death penalty was unconstitutional.'53
Another factor that the Court examined was whether the death
penalty was arbitrarily applied.5" The Court believed each stage of
the death penalty process was an element of chance.'55 Whether a
criminal was put to death was dependent upon an investigation by the
police, the presentation of the prosecution at trial, the effectiveness or
ineffectiveness of defense counsel, the personality of the trial and
appellate judges regarding the death penalty, and the race and
economic status of the criminal.'56 The Court contended that mistakes
are too easily made in such a system. The Court repeatedly referred
to how imprisonment was the better alternative in case a mistake was
made. The President of the Court stated that "unjust imprisonment is
a great wrong, but if it is discovered, the prisoner can be released...
the killing of an innocent person, [however,] is irremediable.'
15 7
After deciding that the death penalty denied citizens equality
under the law, the Court developed a two-stage test to determine
whether the law violated rights under chapter three of the
Constitution.'58 The first stage of the test was to determine if there
149. See generally Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391.
150. Id. at 411, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at 66.
151. Id. at 411-12, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *68.
152. Id. at 412, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *69.
153. Id., available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *70.
154. Id. at 417, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *81.
155. Id. at 418, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *85.
156. Id. at 419, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *86.
157. Id. at 421, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *92.
158. Id. at 435, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *130.
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was disparity between the crime and the penalty.'59 In evaluating
whether a disparity existed, a broad interpretation was given to the
fundamental rights laid out in chapter three of the Constitution."W In
deciding whether proportionality existed between the two, the Court
cited factors such as "the enormity and irredeemable character of the
death sentence in circumstances where neither arbitrariness nor error
exists between the accused and other persons facing similar charges,
race, poverty, and ignorance.''.
The factors mentioned above were not the only ones considered.
Stage two demanded that a Court consider the limitation clause in the
Constitution under Section thirty-three.62 The limitation clause
provided that the rights outlined in chapter three of the Constitution
could be limited only if the limitation was "reasonable and justifiable
in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality..'..
Therefore, the decision of the state to execute someone must be
justifiable under Section thirty-three.16"
The first "right" in chapter three that the Court tested was the
right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment under
Section eleven, subsection two.'65 The state failed to prove, even
under broad interpretation, that the death penalty was proportional
to the crime of murder. 66 Under Section eleven, subsection two of
the Constitution, the Court held that the death penalty was degrading
because it stripped "the convicted person of all dignity" and treated
"him or her as an object to be eliminated by the state."' 67 The death
penalty was perceived as "final and irrevocable," making it an
"undoubtedly cruel punishment."' ' It was also held to be inhumane
because it denied defendants their humanity.69
The Court examined Section nine, specifically, the right to life,
and found that the section was straightforward in guaranteeing the
right to life to every person. An individual's right to life in South
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 433, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *126-27.
162. Id. at 435, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *130.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 433, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *126.
166. Id. at 434, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *128.
167. IdJ at 410, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *64.
168. Id. at 409, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *63.
169. Id. at 409-10, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *63.
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Africa was the "most fundamental of all human rights.' 170
However, under the second stage of the test, the Court looked to
whether the state had a reason to limit the right to life under Section
thirty-three. This stage involved the balancing of: (1) the limitation of
the nature of the right; (2) the importance of the right in a democratic
and free society; (3) the purpose of the limitation and the importance
of that limitation; and (4) the "extent of the limitation," looking
particularly at whether the ends could be reached by way of other,
comparable, less damaging means.
In its case to prove that the state had a reason to limit the right to
life, the state argued that the death penalty was a necessary deterrent
for the "preservation of society... [for] [w]ithout law, society cannot
exist, [and] [w]ithout law [,] individuals in society have no rights."'' It
argued that if the law was too lenient, then the people of South Africa
would begin to take the law into their own hands. 3
The Court disagreed. 4 It stated that the reason crime was at an
all-time high was because of the social changes going on in the
country, including the political turmoil from 1990 to 1994.7 In
addition, poverty and homelessness were on the rise. Finally, the
Court stated that the way to combat crime was to impose a penalty as
a deterrent, and although death penalty and imprisonment are both
deterrents, the Court favored imprisonment. 6 The judges concluded
that the death penalty was unconstitutional."
The judges ordered the state not to execute any citizen in the
future or any criminal already convicted.' The criminals that were
sentenced to die would have their sentences revoked and replaced by
another proper sentence.
As discussed above, the decision of the Constitutional Court was
not based solely on the right to life clause, but found considerable
support for abolition in the dignity clause, the prohibition of cruel,
unusual and degrading punishment, and the equality clause.
170. Id. at 429, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *116.
171. Id. at 436, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *134.
172. Id. at 442, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *148.
173. Id. at 444, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *155.
174. Id. at 442-43, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *150-51.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 443, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *152-53.
177. Id. at 452, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *178.
178. Id., available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *179.
179. Id. at 452, available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *179.
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However, the decision also placed considerable weight on the fact
that the right to life clause did not explicitly recognize the death
penalty as a justified limitation. An explicit recognition of capital
punishment in the Constitution might thus require a reconsideration
of the constitutionality of capital punishment.
South Africa has tried to examine a penalty that was applied
through much of its history in order to make a decision about its
future. The death penalty in South Africa seems to be cyclical. South
Africa has not heard the last of the death penalty. Deputy President
De Klerk has already vowed to contest the decision ending the death
penalty and to move for a constitutional amendment. Where will
South Africa's debate regarding the death penalty lead the country?
Clearly, the history of the death penalty illustrates that the sentiment
regarding the death penalty may change.
1II. International Trends to Abolish the Death Penalty
When the distinguished penologist, Professor Norval Morris,
carried out his survey for the United Nations, covering the years up to
1965, only twelve countries had completely abolished the death
penalty."i ' Only eleven countries had abolished the death penalty for
murder and other ordinary offenses in peacetime. 8' Several more
countries were abolitionist de facto, having executed no one for at
least ten years."n A similar survey, completed for the United Nations
twenty-three years later in 1988, revealed that the number of
completely abolitionist countries had increased from twelve to thirty-
five and those for ordinary offenses from eleven to eighteen.Y
Since 1965, the pace of change has been even more remarkable
due largely to the freedom gained by new states and political changes
in others. Over the short period from 1989 to 1995, an additional
twenty-three countries abolished capital punishment completely and
another three countries abolished it for ordinary crimes.' 84 In other
words, the annual rate at which countries have acted to abolish the
death penalty has increased from an average of about one-and-a-half
180. NORVAL MORRIS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: DEVELOPMENTS 1961 TO 1965, at 7-
9, U.N. Doc. STISOAISDI1O, U.N. Sales No. E. 67.IV (1967).
181. Id. These figures have been calculated from NORVAL MORRIS, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: DEVELOPMENTS 1961 TO 1965, in combination with other sources.
182. Id.
183. See Roger Hood, The Death Penalty: The USA in World Perspective, 6 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 517,519 n.9 (1997).
184. See generally MORRIS, supra note ,180.
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countries per year to nearly four countries per year. Among the
states that have retained the death penalty, at least thirty have not
executed anyone during the past ten years, and thirteen of these
countries have become abolitionist de facto since 1989.' By the end
of 1995, just about a third of all separate political entities had
abolished the death penalty completely, and nearly one in four had
done so for all crimes committed in peacetime.
While most countries are making strides to abolish the death
penalty, a few countries have moved in the opposite direction by
reinstating the death penalty. Three countries - the Philippines,
Papua New Guinea, and Gambia - have reinstated the death penalty.
Likewise, the death penalty was recently restored in two states in the
United States, Kansas (in 1994)"8 and New York (in 1995),'" raising
the number of retentionalist states to thirty-eight. In addition,
attempts have been made to reinstate the death penalty in at least
half the abolitionist states, including Michigan and Rhode Island.'"
At least eleven countries formerly thought to have abandoned their
use of the death penalty have resumed executions, as did several
American states. In 1988, twenty-five of the thirty-six states that had
the death penalty had not executed any person in more than ten
years. By 1995, this number had dwindled to twelve. Since 1990,
Arizona, California, Washington and Wyoming have resumed
executions after a gap of more than a quarter of a century.'"9 The
suspension of capital punishment, even for lengthy periods, has not
eradicated its use. Only complete abolition and a commitment to
international conventions providing for abolition will accomplish the
goal of eliminating the use of the death penalty.
A. International Equal Protection Standards Protecting Those
Facing the Death Penalty
In 1984, the General Assembly of the United Nations endorsed a
resolution, adopted by the Economic and Social Council, listing a
series of nine safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of
those facing the death penalty.'"
185. See Hood, supra note 183, at 7-10.
186. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4624 (1995).
187. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
188. See Hood, supra note 183, at 47-48.
189. Id. at 49-52.
190. Resolutions and Decisions of the Economic And Social Council 1985, U.N.
ESCOR, Supp. 1, 33 (1985).
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These safeguards aim to ensure that capital punishment is
implemented only for the most serious intentional crimes with
extremely grave consequences. The goals of the safeguards are as
follows: (1) to protect convicted people from retroactive applications
of the death penalty; (2) to provide for the possibility of lighter
punishments for those already under sentence of death; (3) to exempt
those under the age of eighteen at the time of the commission of the
crime, pregnant women, new mothers, and those who are or have
become insane; (4) to ensure that the death penalty is only applied
where no possibility of wrongful conviction exists; (5) to ensure that
defendants had a fair trial with legal assistance; (6) to provide
adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense; (7) to provide a
provision for a mandatory appeal and mandatory review for clemency
in all cases; (8) to provide a minimum age for death sentences and
executions; and (9) to provide a provision that no person suffering
from mental retardation or extremely limited mental competence
should be sentenced to death."'
The safeguards further provide for appeals and the possibility of
pardon or commutation of sentences and assurances that no
executions are carried out until all procedures have been
completed."9 Where capital punishment does occur, the safeguards
are intended to ensure that the sentence is carried out with minimal
suffering.93
B. The Effect of Public Opinion upon Capital Punishment in
Other Countries
Several countries that have abolished capital punishment did so
with public opinion strongly favoring its continuance. In fact,
Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins wrote: "in most abolitionist
countries, if the issue had been decided by direct vote rather than by
the legislature, the death penalty probably would not have been
repealed."''" For example, following World War II, both government
officials and the public at large advocated capital punishment in
England."5 At the time, Britain's capital punishment laws were
191. See Implementation of the United Nations Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection
of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty, U.N. Doc. E/1984/50 (1984).
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
AMERICAN AGENDA 3,12 (1986).
195. See JAMES B. CHRISTOPH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND BRITISH POLITIcS 21,
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mandatory for all convicted murderers.'96 Nonetheless, by 1956,
England became de facto abolitionist, and by 1983, the country
upheld an abolitionist stance for all civilian offenses."9
The British experience is similarly replicated in France, Germany
and Australia. In 1982, France's President Mitterrand, who noted his
plan for eliminating the death penalty during his election campaign,
abolished the death penalty while sixty-two percent of the people
favored its retention.198 Similarly, two-thirds of the Federal Republic
of Germany were in favor of retention of the death penalty when
abolition was in process."9 Likewise, Australia remains abolitionist
although a large portion of the population still favors the death
penalty.'
To a lesser extent, a similar phenomenon occurred in Canada. In
1995, the country remained abolitionist despite the fact that forty-four
percent of Canadians still strongly supported the death penalty."'
IV. Proposed Solutions to Ending the Death Penalty
in Countries That Still Assert It
What is essential in order for the death penalty to be
permanently abolished is a campaign to raise public awareness of not
only the horror of the death penalty itself, but of its total lack of
effectiveness in serving as a deterrent. The feelings of helplessness,
frustration, and anger are often at the core of why people believe that
the death penalty should be either reintroduced or retained in a
country. Rising crime rates, civil strife, and terrorist acts are almost
certain to incite public sentiment toward invoking the death penalty.
Furthermore, strong political leadership could prompt abolition.
In today's political environment, leadership sources could form an
abolitionist coalition that would push towards an end to capital
punishment.
A number of countries have attempted to interpret the
22 (1962).
196. Id.
197. See LEON SHASKOLSKY SHELEFF, ULTIMATE PENALTIES: CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, LIFE IMPRISONMENT, PHYSICAL TORTURE 24 (1987).
198. See Shigemitsu Dando, Toward the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 72 IND.
L.J. 7, 8 (1996).
199. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 194, at 21-22. In the Federal Republic
of Germany, capital punishment was entirely abolished in its Constitution.
200. See HOOD, supra note 183, at 214.
201. Id.
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relationship between the right to life and the right to human dignity.
The Hungarian Constitutional Court held that capital punishment is
unconstitutional.' The Hungarian Constitution prohibits the
arbitrary deprivation of life.' Furthermore, Canadian decisions also
offer support for the abolition of the death penalty. For example,
Justice Cory stated in Kindler v. Canada that "the death penalty not
only deprives the prisoner of all vestiges of human dignity, it is the
ultimate desecration of the individual as a human being. It is the
annihilation of the very essence of human dignity."2" Growing
respect for human rights will gradually instill the basic premise that
the value of life cannot be reconciled with death as a form of
punishment.
The question is whether the country or state should, or even has
the right to act as the enforcer of a lynch mob, selecting who is to die
and who is to live. Decisions regarding the imposition of the death
penalty should never be made in charged atmospheres. Moreover,
the public, as well as legislatures, should become informed as to the
myths surrounding the death penalty. Nowhere is information
regarding the death penalty more necessary than when Constitutions
and/or bills of rights are being drafted for newly formed nations.
These nations have the unique opportunity to establish
developmental goals and policies for their people, and should be
encouraged to adopt policies that protect the right to life for all their
people. They should follow the lead of Europe and Latin America,
where the abolition of the death penalty is codified in the regional
system as stemming from the inalienable right to life.
Conclusion
South Africa and Israel no longer impose the death penalty.
South Africa has resolved to abolish the death penalty
constitutionally whereas Israel has achieved a similar result by
making it exceedingly difficult, as a practical matter, to execute
convicted defendants. Although inspired by different historical,
political, and in Israel's case, religious influences, both countries
recognize the importance of human dignity and the right to life. In
202. Decision No. 23/1990 (X. 31) AB Alkotmanybirosag Const. L. Ct. (Docket
No. 891b/199017, Oct. 24, 1990) (Hung.) (examining constitutionality of capital
punishment) (translated copy on file with Stanford Journal of International Law).
203. HuNG. CONST. Ch. xii, art. 54(1).
204. Kindler v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 817.
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Israel, the traditional resistance to imposing the death penalty was
exhibited by various procedural and substantive legal requirements
for convictions in capital cases. These requirements rendered the
imposition of the death penalty virtually impossible.
In South Africa, the abolitionist movement during the 1970s
helped lower the number of people executed. President F.W. De
Klerk furthered these efforts in 1990. South Africa, which once led
the world in executions, has abolished the death penalty by a
unanimous vote of its new Constitutional Court.
Although Israel and South Africa took very different paths in
dealing with capital punishment, their decision to reject the death
penalty as a mode of punishment ultimately brought their paths to a
place of convergence. The question remains, where is each country
headed regarding the death penalty? In Israel, there is and always
has been a historical and moral resistance to exercising the death
penalty. South Africa, however, needed a legal and constitutional
barrier to put a halt to the application of the death penalty. Israel has
a strong domestic precedence in its opposition to the death penalty,
but South Africa's future appears less certain. South Africa has
moved from being a nation that liberally used the death penalty on its
own citizens to one that completely abolished the practice. The fear,
however, is that South Africa swiftly moved from being a notorious
violator of human rights to a champion of human rights, and the lack
of gradation in this process may lead South Africa to regress to its old
ways. However, it appears that even if South Africa were to reinstate
the death penalty, the Constitutional Court may allow for its
resumption, but with very stringent guidelines. 5
205. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-30 (1972). Use of the
death penalty came to a halt in the United States when the Supreme Court rendered
its longest written opinion in its history in Furman. The Court held that the death
penalty laws in many states were unconstitutional because they violated the Eighth
Amendment. Here, the Court did not analyze whether the punishment itself is "cruel
and unusual." Therefore, for the death penalty to be constitutional, states need only
make the procedure for imposing the death penalty constitutional.
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